Emory International Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 0 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Seventieth Anniversary
2019

Origins of NATO: 1948--1949
Lawrence S. Kaplan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Origins of NATO: 1948--1949, 34 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 11 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol34/iss0/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

KAPLANPROOFS2_10.24.19

10/28/2019 1:48 PM

ORIGINS OF NATO: 1948-1949
Lawrence S. Kaplan*
OVERVIEW
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) originated in the trauma of
World War II. The human cost of that war at last motivated Europe to remove
the barriers to economic integration that had promoted warfare among the
nation-states since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.1 The devastation of western
Europe also inspired the United States as the major victor in that war to abandon
its traditional isolation from European political and military affairs.2
Accelerating these fundamental changes was the awareness on both sides of the
Atlantic of the threat Soviet-led Communism posed to the future of Western
democracy.3
However, recognizing the necessity did not equate with effective immediate
action to cope with these two challenges in the post-war world. Too many
obstacles had to be overcome. For Europeans to rebuild, Europe required a
defeated Germany in the New Order, an almost impossible task considering the
behavior of its Nazi past. For Americans, the tradition of non-entanglement in
the affairs of the Old World after the termination of the Franco-American
Alliance of 1778 was not yet breached.4
Despite the frequent charges that NATO was a product of America’s
imperial reach after World War II, it was Europe’s initiative—not that of the
United States—which opened the way to NATO. Led by Britain’s Foreign
Minister, Ernest Bevin, and France’s counterpart, Georges Bidault, Western
Europeans feared that their efforts to collaborate in a future defense organization
could not succeed without American involvement.5 Their economies could not
be rebuilt without massive American support, and their defense capabilities

*

Director, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies, 1979–1993.
See Pierre Beaudry, The Economic Policy that Made the Peace of Westphalia, 30 EXECUTIVE
INTELLIGENCE REV. 18 (2000); Nikolaus Wolf, European Economic Integration: Undoing 1914–1945, VOX:
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could not cope with the aggressive Soviet Union without an American
commitment to counterbalance the Communist adversary.
What the Europeans wanted from the United States was clear: join a new
western alliance that would deter the Soviets from further military pressure. This
was not a solution the Truman Administration could accept; the U.S. public was
too suspicious of European intentions.6 Yet there was a way to link America to
Europe: the Marshall Plan of 1947.7 The Plan recognized that only an infusion
of American aid could revive the economies of Western Europe and make them
prosperous consumers of American manufactures. This aid was not a loan as in
World War I, but an investment that would benefit the American economy.8 A
further potential advantage for the West was that European revival could make
the beneficiaries of U.S. aid partners in the containment of Soviet-led
Communism.9
The escalation of Soviet threats to the West had already accelerated U.S.
movement toward military entanglement with Europe. The key concept was
embodied in the term containment.10 “This change did not signify acceptance of
binding agreements with European nations. It did mean that the United States
was prepared to recognize that the survival of Western democracies threatened
by Communist external aggression or internal subversion was vital to the
security of the United States itself.”11 The Truman [A]dministration drew on the
advice of George F. Kennan, a Soviet specialist in Moscow, whose seminal ‘long
telegram’ in 1946 outlined a way to manage the menace in order to give direction
to this policy.12 “As a scholarly and perceptive student of Communism, Kennan
propounded the thesis that only firm containment could control the dynamic
ideology of the Soviet system. Conventional diplomacy was irrelevant to the
relationship between the two nations. So was the U.N.”13
“Hostility was inherent in the nature of the two societies.”14 Aside from
conventional warfare, “[t]he only way to cope with this challenge was by patient

6

See LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, UNITED STATES AND NATO: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 58 (1984).
See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 13.
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Id. at 6.
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Id. at 5.
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Id. (alteration in original).
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Id.
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Id. See Vojtech Mastny, NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56 1, 4
(Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars’ Cold War Int’l History Project, Working Paper No. 35, 2002).
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containment of Soviet expansionism, anticipating the day when its economic
failures and lack of internal cohesion would lead to its demise.”15 My take on
implications of Kennan’s likening Communism to a religion, like Christianity
and Islam, would lead to schisms that would weaken its authority.16 In 1947,
Kennan won an appointment as head of the State Department’s policy planning
staff because of his containment recommendations.”17
Yet neither Congress nor the nation at large seemed to share Kennan’s
views.18 The Truman Administration’s policymakers used Greece’s civil war to
force the U.S. to come to grips with Britain’s inability to afford continuous
support of the Greek government against Communist armed forces.19 This
“became the occasion to assume the British burden in the Mediterranean.”20 The
Truman Doctrine was announced in March of 1947, “promising economic and
military support to the beleaguered countries of Greece and Turkey, who at that
time were combatting Soviet pressures on their borders.”21 The Truman doctrine
posed a bigger promise, “to support as well [as to] ‘free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’”22
“Although Kennan recognized that the [D]octrine was more sweeping than
anything he had envisioned, the Truman [A]dministration understood the need
for jarring the U.S. public out of its complacency.”23 However, the
administration’s leaders knew that military aid alone would not be sufficient to
assure Europeans.24 Europe needed massive economic aid to promote both its
recovery and ability to resist the intimidation of Communism.25
The Marshall Plan emerged from Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s
commencement speech on June 5, 1947, at Harvard University.26
Undersecretaries of State Dean Acheson and William L. Clayton formed it “to

15

KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 5 (alteration in original).
See id. at 5.
17
Id. at 6.
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Id.
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Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The
Truman Doctrine, 1 PUB. PAPERS 176, 178–79 (Mar. 12, 1947)).
23
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 6.
24
Id. (alteration in original).
25
Id.; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 4.
26
See George C. Marshall, U.S. Sec’y of State, Commencement Address at Harvard University (June 5,
1947), https://www.oecd.org/general/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm.
16

KAPLANPROOFS_10.24.19

14

10/28/2019 1:48 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

be an extension of the Truman Doctrine.”27 For the United States to provide
effective support of the military efforts of embattled nations, “as it rallied to the
defense of Greece and Turkey, it was necessary that the economic base of the
beneficiaries had to be strong enough to take advantage of military assistance.”28
In order to not replicate the chaos that was occurring in Greece and Turkey, in
France or Italy—where large Communist parties were flourishing—“the United
States must help Europeans create economic conditions that would permit them
to cope with the promises of Communism.”29 The Marshall Plan—or European
Recovery Program—“promised massive economic aid to countries that . . .
demonstrate[ed] a willingness to help themselves and to break down barriers
with other beneficiaries of U.S. support.”30
In one sense, the Marshall Plan was an unparalleled success. The tweleve
billion dollars not only nurtured the recovery of Europe, but also advanced the
movement toward European integration.31 In the mind of President Truman, “the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were ‘two halves of the same walnut.’”32
However, the complimentary nature of the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan was not apparent to all observers.33 Walter Lippmann, an
influential observer, initially found irreconcilable differences between the two
initiatives.34 To Lippmann, the suddenness of the Truman message to Congress
suggested “a hasty reflex action driven by the exigencies of the moment rather
a carefully worked out plan within the larger frame of foreign policy.”35 While,
“military aid to Greece and Turkey was primarily a stopgap military exercise,
plugging leaks in a corner of Europe.”36 In this context, the Truman Doctrine
“was just a major strike in the burgeoning Cold War.”37

27

KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 7.
Id.; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 4.
29
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 7; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 4.
30
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 7 (alteration in original).
31
Marshal Plan, 1948, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/
marshall-plan (last updated Apr. 8, 2018); see CURT TARNOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45079, THE
MARSHALL PLAN: DESIGN, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 16–19 (2018).
32
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 7 (alteration in original) (citing JOSEPH M. JONES, THE FIFTEEN WEEKS 233
(1955)).
33
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 8 (internal footnote omitted).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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According to Lippmann, the Marshall Plan, “was a more mature expression
of the assistance the United States gave Europe after World War I without the
stigma associated with unpaid loans.”38 The Truman Administration recognized
that its own prosperity rested on the economic recovery of Europe.39 The
Truman Administration required “European beneficiaries to give evidence of
their own efforts toward recovery” in order to ensure success in Congress.40 This
could be done by showing “progress by reducing trade barriers that had prevailed
before World War II and moving toward economic integration of the continent
or at least that part of Europe outside Soviet control.”41
If any doubts existed “about the conjunction between the Marshall Plan and
the U.N., the endorsement of leaders of the American Association for the United
Nations (AAUN) should have resolved them.”42 The Marshall Plan, with its
emphasis on European self-help and mutual aid, satisfied many Americans,
including Lippmann, who had been worried about the Truman Doctrine’s
excessive dependence on arms to counter Soviet expansionism.43
Approval from Congress came as well, “but only after agonizing debates
about spending so much money on possibly unreliable and ungrateful
beneficiaries.”44 Skeptics “wondered about the lasting effectiveness of foreign
aid as well as the potential impact on the domestic economy.”45 Republican
Robert Taft of Ohio, who had led the isolationist wing of the Republican Party
before and during World War II, “managed to cut the proposed three-year
program to a single year, with proportionate reduction in funds” for this period.46
Congress came to terms with the interim aid bill on December 15, 1947
following the “impending breakdown” of the four-powers Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting in London.47 The bill became Public Law 389 of the Foreign
Aid Act of 1947 two days later.48

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. (alteration in original).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 9.
43
TARNOFF, supra note 31, at 5; KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 8.
44
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 9.
45
Id.
46
Id. (alteration in original).
47
Id. The “four powers” at the December 1947 Council of Foreign Ministers’ London meeting were the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. Council of Foreign Ministers, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Foreign-Ministers.
48
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 9.
39
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Flying back to Washington immediately after the adjournment of the
London conference, [Secretary] Marshall lent his weight to the [A]ct
in a radio report on [December 19]. He made it clear to the U.S. public
that the East-West conflict would be fought out over the [European
Recovery Program] rather than over the a [sic] doomed peace
conference on the future of Germany. This modest success was a signal
for the full aid program to proceed in full force.49

Generally, Europeans recognized the opportunity that had been offered by
the Marshall Plan and proceeded to meet it. With British and French foreign
ministers leading the way, Europeans sought to demonstrate that they could
overcome the economic barriers that had “bedeviled interstate relations in the
past” and to show that they had the ability to utilize the massive aid envisioned
in the European Recovery Program “to serve the unity as well as the recovery of
Europe. Sixteen nations from the East, as well as from the West, met in Paris in
July 1947 and established the Committee of European Economic Cooperation
(CEEC) … to implement themes laid out in Secretary Marshall’s [June 1947
commencement] address.”50
But before any funds were authorized, it became evident that the Marshall
Plan deepened the East-West split.51 The Soviets had been invited to join the
program, but after sending delegates to Paris they recognized the dangers it
posed to their control of Eastern Europe.52 They withdrew from discussions
about how to utilize American aid and forced Ukraine and Belorussia to do the
same, fearing accurately that the CEEC would undermine their control of
Eastern Europe.53 Their reaction, in fact, was a relief to the State Department.54
Had the Soviets become partners, it was unlikely that Congress would have
passed the interim aid bill.55
Assuredly, the “vehement Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan accelerated
the Cold War, even if it did not ignite it.”56 Foreign Ministers Bevin and Bidault
had always understood “that there had to be a military as well as a political and
economic dimension to U.S. support.”57 Not long before the collapse of the
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 9–10 (alteration in original) (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. at 10 (alteration in original).
Id. at 10, 35.
Id. at 10; Mastny, supra note 14, at 5.
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 10; Mastny, supra note 14, at 5.
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
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London Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, “Bidault asked
[Secretary] Marshall . . . about a U.S. contribution to European security. He
received no satisfactory answer.”58 There was silence on the question of “the
United States joining any Western European defense program, but the
Europeans felt a path was opening.”59
On December 12, 1947, during Secretary Marshall’s speech to the Pilgram
Society in London that path expanded when two foreign ministers detected
favorable implications in his speech.60 In the speech there was no mention of
U.S. interest in participating in a European military organization. However,
Secretary Marshall “emphasized the beneficial effects that the ERP would have
on the regeneration of Europe.”61 Ultimately, “this was sufficient
encouragement for the allies to agree that Franco-British staff talks should be
held, with the hope of including the United States in the future.”62 On December
23, 1948, when U.S. officials seemed to be receptive, the allies were ready to
present a blueprint of a western European military alliance.63 Sensitive to
American anxieties, Bevin spoke to a Marshall aide about security
arrangements—a smaller one encompassing treaties with France and the
Benelux countries and a larger, looser treaty with other European countries.64
Both would have treaty commitments from the United States and Canada.
In the fall of 1947, “the concept of a Western association, if not alliance, was
in the air…outside the confines of Anglo-French conversations.”65 Canadian
statesmen, “were at the forefront of concerns about Atlantic links in which their
country would occupy a key role mediating between the United States and
Europe.”66 On September 18, 1947, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent,
while addressing the U.N. General Assembly is credited with first proposing
“‘an association of peace-loving states’ that would pursue the goals of the [U.N.
C]harter.”67

58

Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (internal footnote omitted).
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 16. “Benelux is the abbreviation used to describe the [economic] union of the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” Howard J. Hilton, Jr., Benelux—A Case Study in Economic Union, 23
DEP’T ST. BULL. 181, 181 (1950).
65
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 16.
66
Id.
67
Id. (alteration in original).
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U.S. reactions to a potential new relationship with Europe were generally
favorable, ranging from enthusiastic on the part of key diplomats to cautious
from the Secretary of State Marshall and Undersecretary of State Robert A.
Lovett.68 An influential senior State Department official—John D. Hickerson,
director of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs—saw no
alternative to bonding with Bevin and Bidault.69 The Europeans valued this
backing even though Hickerson and his colleagues were not at the level of
authority they would have preferred.
After the breakdown of the foreign ministers meeting, Hickerson shared with
a shipmate, John Foster Dulles, “putative [S]ecretary of [S]tate (should the
Republicans win the White House in 1948) that [Secretary] Marshall’s response
[to Europe’s initiative] was not good enough.”70 Hickerson was among the
leading U.S. statesmen to declare “that only U.S. acceptance of a military
alliance could create sufficient confidence” for Europe to benefit both from the
Marshall Plan and military assistance.71 Recognizing the opposition they faced
from a hesitant Congress, Hickerson and his team were to become the engine
that would break the long tradition of U.S. non-entanglement in the military and
political affairs of Europe.
Buoyed as he was by the perception of impending change in U.S. foreign
policy, Bevin shrewdly took incremental steps that he hoped would result in a
full-fledged alliance.72 However, “[t]he signals announcing the impending union
of Western Europe were…mixed.”73 When Bevin spoke of a spiritual federation
of the West, “Britain and the United States held different assumptions about the
meaning of federation, and neither gave much credence to the spiritual character
of federation.”74 From the perspective of the U.S., the first priority of the
Administration was “not providing military aid, let alone joining a Western
federation, but securing congressional approval for the Marshall Plan.”75

68

See id. at 17.
See SYDNEY SNYDER, FINGERPRINTS ON HISTORY: THE NATO MEMOIRS OF THEODORE C. ACHILLES
19 (Sydney Snyder & Lawrence S. Kaplan eds. 1992) (Ted Achilles, Hickerson’s deputy, made this point clear).
70
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 17 (alteration in original).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 24.
73
Id. at 23 (alteration in original).
74
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Id. (alteration in original).
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At the State Department and the Pentagon, there was no consensus about the
role of the U.S. role in Europe’s defense.76 France’s position was “even less
promising.”77 Its “preoccupation was still centered on the dangers of a German
revival, even as Georges Bidault worked to redirect the nation’s attention to the
Soviet danger. Ernest Bevin’s unified Europe offered no solutions to [France’s]
concerns.”78 Military leaders in Britain were not yet convinced that “France was
a reliable military partner and continued to resist commit[ting] British troops to
Europe in the event of war.”79
To circumvent most of these obstacles, Bevin had to assure Americans that
the nationalism that had plagued Europe for centuries was a relic of the past.
Britain’s pact with France at Dunkirk in 1947 unveiled a new Anglo-French
solidarity.80 But this action was not enough to lure the United States into a
similar arrangement. Bevin knew that any U.S. membership in a European
military organization would have to consider its relationship to the United
Nations Charter.81 More importantly, it would have to be a product of a
European initiative.
Given these caveats, Bevin surprised the West with a moving address to the
House of Commons on January 22, 1948.82 The “speech had been in the making
since the breakdown of the [Council] of Foreign Ministers in London five weeks
before.”83 The details had been kept secret before it was ultimately unveiled, as
Bevin intended it to be a high water-mark in British history.84 It was.85 It
contained generalities reflecting his hope for a new order of relations in the
West.86 It also contained specifics—his intention to negotiate a pact with the
Benelux countries.87 Joining them would be other members of western Europe,
embracing those nations that were outside Soviet control: Norway, Denmark,
Italy, and ultimately, even a reformed Germany.88 References to the United

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 23–24 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 12.
NICHOLAS HENDERSON, THE BIRTH OF NATO 3 (1983).
See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 28; HENDERSON, supra note 81, at 6; Mastny, supra note 14, at 6.
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 28 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 28.
Id.; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 6.
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 28.
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States, while Delphic, were prophetic: America’s power and resources would be
needed if the new allies were to create a stable world order.89
Because the United States was the principal target of Bevin’s speech, he was
justified in believing he had succeeded.90 The State Department issued a
statement “heartily endorsing his proposals as reinforcing the efforts of the two
nations for peace. Equally if not more important than the [A]dministration’s
imprimatur was the boost [the speech] gave to the passage of the” European
Recovery Program (ERP), which, according to John Foster Dulles, “was ‘more
than ever imperative’ in light of Britain’s plans for Western unity.”91
Bevin seized the opportunity to raise the issue of a defense agreement with
the United States that would “give Europeans an incentive to commit themselves
to a defense system.”92 But Marshall and Lovett balked. Any agreement
involving the use of armed force “would have to respect ‘certain procedures
within the executive branches as well as the appropriate congressional
committees.’”93 Thus, Europe must take the first steps before engaging with the
United States. However, only after Americans knew exactly what the Europeans
were prepared to do for themselves would the Administration take action.94 This
was the position not only of the cautious secretaries, but also of such influential
figures as State Department Counselor, Charles E. Bohlen, and Policy Planning
Staff Head, George Kennan.95
In this circumstance, the surge toward a transatlantic commitment might
have been stopped in its tracks. The Benelux countries felt marginalized by the
Anglo-French condominium, while France remained skittish over the possibility
of the new allies appeasing Germany.96 It is hardly surprising that the American
converts to an alliance, such as Hickerson and his associates in the State
Department, were dismayed at these developments.97 The movement toward
America’s entanglement with Europe was restored less by diplomacy than by a
series of repressive acts on the part of the Soviet Union.98 Not least among the

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 30.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 20, 36.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 42–43.
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West’s perceptions of Soviet provocations was the Berlin Blockade, denying the
Western allies’ access to Berlin airports.99 It was the Soviets’ response to a
German currency reform that the three Western partners put together initially as
bizonia in January 1947 and, ultimately, as trizonia in June 1947 when France
linked its zone to its allies’.100 But this challenge was met successfully by an
airlift that preserved the Western presence in West Berlin.101
An even more ominous indication of Soviet intention to consolidate a
Communist bloc in the East was the shocking Prague coup in February 1948 that
not only ousted the democratic leadership in Czechoslovakia, but also was
responsible for the suicide—or, more likely, perhaps, the murder—of its foreign
minister, Jan Masaryk.102 This coup was all the more disturbing in light of
former President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk’s and 1947 Prime Minister Eduard
Beneš’s roles in establishing the Democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia in
Pittsburgh during World War I.103
The coup in [Prague] coincided with a series of events that appeared
to be a prelude to a Communist takeover of Western Europe. In
February, Italian Communists, having failed to overthrow the
government of Alcide de Gasperi in December 1947, were poised to
win power at the polls in the April [1948] elections. [At the same time,
t]he Soviet Union was pressuring Norway[, which shared a border with
the Soviet Union,] to sign a nonaggression pact that could force that
country into the Soviet orbit.104

The Communist presence in the “Mediterranean and at the approaches to the
Atlantic was a sobering prospect for the United States, arguably more than for
Europe[].”105 Each of these worries itself “might have been sufficient to push
the United States into a new relationship with western Europe,” but it was the
fate of Czechoslovakia that ultimately traumatized the U.S. to the extent of
involving the Administration in an entangling alliance of the sort John Hickerson
and Theodore Achilles had been urging since December 1947.106 A more

99

Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 36, 42–43. The bizonia and trizonia were the British and French occupation zones in Germany.
SCMP Reporter, Division of Germany after WWII, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 24, 1993; 12:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/article/19696/division-germany-after-wwii.
101
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 107–08; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 6.
102
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 43, 49.
103
Id. at 43, 49–50.
104
Id. at 49 (alteration in original); see id. at 55; Mastny, supra note 14, at 7–8.
105
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 49 (alteration in original).
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Id.
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immediate impact of the coup was the ironing out of differences within members
of the Brussels Pact—especially France’s continuing fear of Germany.107 The
formal creation of the Western Union by the Brussels Pact powers was on March
17, 1948.108 They were rewarded by another major U.S. step toward an alliance
with Europe—President Truman’s address to Congress on March 17, 1948, in
which he congratulated Europeans on the conclusion of the Brussels Pact and
pledged U.S. support of their efforts to protect themselves.109
But the question remained exactly what role the United States would play in
the uniting of European nations. American proponents of a military alliance had
won, but the victory was shrouded in secret conversations in the Pentagon with
the British and Canadians.110 The French were excluded because of concerns
about Communist influence in the French Cabinet.111 Concessions had to be
made to American sensitivities. The proposed U.S. participation in a regional
defense organization was based on Articles 51 and 52 of the U.N. Charter.112
Care was taken to have the proposal conform to the Charter, allowing individual
and regional defense without invoking a Soviet veto. This measure was vital to
the success of the negotiations. To ensure congressional approval, they included
a requirement that western European members pool their military resources to
underscore their contribution to their defense efforts.113 Because Italy and
Scandinavia—two areas under Soviet threat—would be included, the result
would be essentially an enlarged Western Union.114 These secret meetings were
held in the last week of March 1948.115 It seemed, after all, that Bevin and
Bidault had succeeded in drawing the U.S. into the Western Union.116
Nevertheless, there were a course of obstacles that postponed completion of
a transatlantic treaty. First, was the “discomfort of leading members of the State
Department.”117 Lovett, the Acting Secretary of State, reluctantly approved the

107

Id. at 59–60; see Mastny, supra note 14, at 7.
The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17,
1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Pact]. The parties to the Brussels Pact, or the Treaty of Brussels,
were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Id.
109
94 CONG. REC. 2986, 2996–97 (1948).
110
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 67.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 67–68.
114
Id. at 68.
115
Id. at 67.
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Id. at 69.
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alliance on the assumption that the Europeans would fulfill their promises.118
Second, was the secrecy surrounding the negotiations that would have
repercussions in light of France’s exclusion.119 Third, was “the judgment of the
Senate” whose enthusiasm for aid to Europe did not yet include American
membership in an alliance.120
If there was any one figure responsible for an American commitment to
Europe, it was Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI) Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.121 A former leader of the isolationists in the
Republican Party, Senator Vandenberg was a convert to internationalism in
World War II and proved to be a powerful voice in bringing his party into a
European alliance.122 But his support was conditional upon accepting the
preeminence of the U.N. as indispensable to the new relationship.123 Committed
as he was to European security, he demanded assurance that this relationship
would not replicate the balance-of-power politics of pre-war Europe.124 He
insisted as well any negotiation for an alliance would require Senate
involvement.125
The “end product of long discussions in April 1948 was the Vandenberg
Resolution,” affirming that the U.S. association with regional arrangements for
individual and collective defense would not bypass Congress or the U.N. if war
broke out in Europe.126 “There was no call for an alliance, but a loose
construction of the [R]esolution opened the way for just such a result….”127 The
Resolution passed the United States Senate by a vote of 64 to 4 on June 11,
1948.128 This action was not quite acceptance of an alliance, but it might as well
have made this announcement, as it was followed by an agreement from the
United States, Britain, and Canada to enter into exploratory talks with the
Brussels Pact countries.129 The Vandenberg Resolution loosened the brakes that
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the State Department wanted to retain on the movement toward an entangling
alliance.130
The future allies met in Washington, D.C. from July to September 1948.131
NATO grew out of these exploratory talks that followed America’s acceptance
of a military alliance with the Brussels Pact powers. Inevitably, these were
contentious sessions. They all agreed on the necessity of American leadership in
the new organization.132 They also agreed on the ongoing development of
European integration, on opposition to Soviet expansion, and on France’s
insistence on a cautious approach to the revival of Germany.133 Their
disagreements centered on the priority of recipients of U.S. military assistance;
France was intent upon being at the head of the line.134 They wrangled over the
number of members; the Western Union powers would limit membership to the
Brussels Pact.135 They were particularly agitated over potential American
evasion of the commitment through the ambiguous language of Article 5 of the
proposed treaty.136
The Brussels partners would have preferred the Article to conform with
Article 4 of the Brussels Pact, which clearly stated that an attack on one member
would require the other members to provide “all the military and other aid and
assistance in their power” in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 in the
U.N. Charter.137 The United States refused to accept this clarity.138 Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty agreed that an attack against one “shall be considered
an attack against them all.”139 But further response was evasive: each of the
parties “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security
of the North Atlantic area.”140 The Brussels Pact allies managed to insert “the
use of armed force” into the article, but that was all they could do to ensure the
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response they wanted.141 If the allies could have had their way, the alliance, like
the Brussels Pact, would last 50 years.142 Instead, they had to settle for an
evaluation of the treaty after 10 years and an ability to withdraw from the treaty
after 20 years.143
There was no expectation that the Washington talks would be definitive at
any point in time. The adjective exploratory revealed its limits.144 “No one was
under any illusion that a treaty could be completed before the U.S. presidential
election in November [1948].”145 At that time the Europeans—and the U.S.
press—were convinced that the Republicans under their candidate, Thomas E.
Dewey, would defeat Truman and sign the treaty.146 The drafting committee “did
produce a paper ready to be submitted to the home governments of the
participating nations. After all the wrangling over issues dear to individual
countries or to the Western Union bloc as a whole, the players all agreed that
they had come up with a workable [plan].”147 The drafting committee included
reference to collaboration in economic, social, and cultural fields (Article 3);
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid (Article 4); and provision for
mutual assistance in meeting an armed attack (Article 5).148 The language of the
fifth article never satisfied the allies, but it was the best they could get.149
It “did not matter that the scope of the alliance was not settled, that
membership was far from complete, or that the critical Article 5 was given
multiple interpretations.”150 What mattered “was the message tucked into a onesentence paragraph in the memorandum….‘No alternative to a treaty appears to
meet the essential requirements.’ And the most essential requirement was the
incorporation of the United States into a transatlantic security system.”151 The
North Atlantic Treaty would not become a reality for another six months, but its
substance was in place by September of 1948.152
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While the essence of the alliance was evident in September 1948, it took
more than half a year before the new allies agreed to enlarge the alliance by
including Italy, Portugal, and Scandinavian nations.153 The combination of an
American presence and a Soviet adversary guaranteed approval, despite the
adherence of authoritarian Portugal and Mediterranean Italy in an alliance based
on democratic and “Atlantic” values.154 The result was a patchwork composed
of practical compromises that admitted Portugal, despite its ambivalent relations
with Nazi Germany.155 Its neutrality in World War II and its longstanding links
to Britain neutralized its undemocratic character.156 And while Italy’s
geographic position was distant from the Atlantic, its successful resistance to
Communism, along with France’s partnership and American patronage, were
sufficient credentials to make it a charter member of NATO.157
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949.158 The Organization
has lasted seventy years with no withdrawals, having grown from 12 to 29
members in that period.159 After seventy years, NATO remains a vital link
between North America and Western Europe. It may be credited with the
accession of West Germany in 1955, ending 300 years of Franco-German
wars.160 It may also be credited with advancing European political integration
through its support of the European Union.161
Still the challenges are daunting, if not at the level of 1949. The democratic
framework that sustained NATO over the years has been frayed by the
resurgence of nationalism within Alliance member states that could conceivably
destroy the Alliance.162 The wars in the Middle East have strained the social
fabric of many of the Allies, and the Russian threat to the Baltic nations has
revived fears of the Soviet years.163
How many of the changes that took place since 1949 could the framers have
anticipated? The advance of European integration might have exceeded
153
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expectations. The evolution of the European Union from economic links
between France and Germany in 1951 to a potentially united Europe in 2019
was an aspiration few Europeans or Americans would have believed possible.164
Nor was the dissolution of the Soviet Empire a credible possibility, outside the
imagination of George Kennan.165 On the negative side, the decline of the three
major European allies—Britain, France, and Germany—would not have been
assumed.166 While the undoing of the Yalta Agreement dividing Europe was a
reasonable hope, the rapid extension of NATO into the Baltics and Balkans in
the 21st century would have found many skeptics among the Organization’s
founding fathers.167 Arguably, the familiar presence of a hostile Russia was a
constant worry even without the specter of Communist domination.168
Considering the range of malaises currently afflicting NATO, what kind of
future can the Alliance anticipate? There could be a movement toward
dissolution, as Allies drift away or lose confidence in U.S. leadership. NATO
then might survive on paper but be as irrelevant as the League of Nations was
after World War II. But if it should dissolve, what would be the consequences
for the United States and its allies?
Termination of the Alliance would mean the end of the intimate links
between the United States and Europe that have benefited both sides since the
Alliance’s inception. NATO has never been just a military organization. It is an
intricate mix of political and military connections that kept fissures from
splitting its membership. Without NATO, the United States would lose its status
as a European power, consequently losing its historic post-World War II role in
bolstering the confidence of European nations. NATO’s disappearance would
have an immediate effect on a Europe unprepared to assume NATO’s burden.169
The European Union lacks the will as well as the financial resources to become
the “United States of Europe.”170 Its 28 members have too many divergent
priorities that would prevent it from taking effective collective action.171
The beneficiaries of the withdrawal of NATO’s presence in Europe would
be an ambitious Russia already active in sowing dissension in western Europe,
164
The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/history_en.
165
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 235.
166
See id. at 237–38.
167
Id. at 236
168
See id. 238–41.
169
See id. at 238–39.
170
See id. 238–42.
171
Id.

KAPLANPROOFS_10.24.19

28

10/28/2019 1:48 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

and China, a world power eager to replace the United States as the global leader.
Divorced from Europe, the United States would feel the loss not just of its
position in Europe, but also of the stability that the transatlantic connection has
nourished over seventy years. The rise of nationalism, expressed as isolationism
in the American form, would cement the divisions and weaken all the former
members of NATO. Despite all these challenges, NATO has survived intact;
none of its members have elected to leave the Organization.
At this time, dramatic termination of the Alliance is unlikely. There are
sufficient countervailing centripetal forces to keep it viable—from reversal of
current U.S. actions damaging to NATO to activity on the part of its European
members in response to much of the criticism that the Trump Administration has
leveled against them.172 There has never been a year since the Alliance was
formed that critics have not predicted its impending end.173 NATO has survived
the predictions. Given the state of the world seventy years later, its life is worth
preserving.
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